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VOLUME 1973 FALL, 1973 NUMBER 4
BLACK AMERICANS AND THE BURGER COURT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR TIE POLITICAL SYSTEM
LUCIUS 3. BARKER*
In recent years there has been considerable commentary on the pos-
ture of the Burger Court toward black Americans and civil rights in-
terests.1 During the Warren Court era, the Supreme Court was gen-
erally pictured as supporting these interests.2 Under Chief Justice
Burger, however, this image of the Court seems to be fading; Presi-
dent Nixon's 1968 campaign pledge to reverse the decisional tenden-
* Edna F. Gellhorn University Professor of Public Affairs and Professor of
Political Science, Washington University. B.A., 1949, Southern University of Louisiana;
M.A, Ph.D., 1954, University of Illinois.
1. For general commentary on the Warren and Burger Courts, see Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
ing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972); Kal-
yen, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term-Foreword: Even When a Nation Is at War-,
85 HARv. L. REv. 3 (1971); Kurland, 1970 Term: Notes on the Emergence of the
Burger Court, 1971 Sup. Cr. REv. 265. For specific attention to the relation to blacks
of the transition on the Court, see McGee, Blacks, Due Process, and Efficiency in the
Clash of Values as the Supreme Court Moves to the Right, 2 BLACK LU. 220 (1972);
Tollett, The Viability and Reliability of the Supreme Court as an Institution for Social
Change and Progress Beneficial to Blacks, 2 BLACK L.J. 197 (1972).
2. Analysis of the Warren Court in this respect is voluminous. For balanced yet
sympathetic views of the Court, see A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTrUTIONAL
Dm:SON AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM 24-50, 114-34 (1968); R. SAYLER, THE WAR-
KEN COURT 1-31, 46-57, 152-61 (1969). For a thoughtful discussion of the sensitivity
of the Warren Court to the relation of first amendment freedoms to the goals of black
Americans, see Greenberg, The Supreme Court, Civil Rights, and Civil Dissonance, 77
YALE L.J. 1520 (1968).
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cies of the Warren Court by appointing "strict constructionists"8 ap-
pears to be meeting with some success. After less than three years
in office, the President had the rare opportunity to fill four vacancies
on the nine-man Court, including the position of Chief Justice. 4  The
protracted confirmation battles that attended several of the President's
nominations, plus the decisions of the Nixon appointees once on the
Court, demonstrate that some changes in the decisional output of the
Court were anticipated and are indeed occurring.
My purpose here is to examine these changes in the broader context
of the role of the Supreme Court in the efforts of blacks to achieve
objectives within the political system as it presently operates. Specif-
ically, this Article will attempt to describe the posture of the Burger
Court, as reflected in its decisions, 5 relative to racial justice and the
quality of life for black Americans, and to consider the implications
of this posture in terms of the capability of the political system to deal
with civil rights problems.
The Article is divided into three parts. Part I discusses the position
of the Burger Court in cases relating directly to racial justice. Part
II discusses the general stance of the Court with respect to the de-
veloping areas of "poverty law," or rights of the poor, and the rights
of persons accused of crime. That policies in these two areas are on
the surface non-racial should not obscure their practical and often criti-
cal influence in the everyday lives of black Americans.0 Part HI dis-
cusses the implications that the transition from the Warren Court to
the Burger Court holds for blacks and the political system.
3. See Dworkin, The Jurisprudence of Richard Nixon, N.Y. REV. OF BooKs, May
4, 1972, at 27-35.
4. In examining the history of the Court, Robert Dahl has found that a Presi-
dent can expect to appoint one new Justice about every twenty-one months, or about
two new Justices during one term of office. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:
The Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 58 (1957).
5. Two comments are in order here. First, in this Article, I intend to look at
the Court from a macroanalytic or institutional, rather than from a microanalytic or
individual, viewpoint. Hence, I shall refer to either the Warren Court or the Burger
Court without attempting, except in a few instances, to engage in more particularistic
analysis of the behavior of the various Justices. Secondly, while my discussion of de-
cisions of the Burger Court is not intended to be exhaustive, I hope the cases discussed
are representative of the decisions in various areas.
6. Derrick Bell's comment seems especially appropriate: "A hardening of atti-
tudes toward the poor equals a more difficult time for blacks, even though race is never
mentioned." Bell, Black Faith in a Racist Land, 20 J. PuB. L. 409 (1971).
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I
Generally, the Burger Court has tempered the trend and tone of
the Warren Court in combatting racial segregation and discrimination.
To be certain, the Court has continued to pursue the command of
Brown v. Board of Education7 to eliminate racial segregation in public
schools. In 1969, for example, the Court unanimously held against
the attempts of the Justice Department to delay implementation of in-
tegration plans in certain Mississippi school districts.8 In so doing the
Court reiterated the formula established late in the Warren Court era9
that integration of public schools must begin "at once," eliminating
any apprehensions of a return to the "all deliberate speed" guideline
of Brown. Further, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Edu-
cation'° the Court approved busing as a judicial tool in integrating pub-
lic school districts where officials had deliberately created or enforced
a "dual" system on racial lines. Swann granted federal judges wide
discretion to establish remedial measures in combatting state-enforced
segregation. At the same time, however, Swann may be construed by
lower courts to lessen judicial presence in this area, especially if in their
view a unitary school system has been achieved."
In Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado,'2 a re-
cent desegregation case, the Court declined to build on the "activism"
of the Warren Court's desegregation decisions by continuing to recog-
nize the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation. Keyes
did put northern school districts on notice that where intentional segre-
gation occurred in particular units within a school district, those units
must be desegregated, and that the burden of proving that a policy
of intentional segregation in that unit did not demonstrate a segrega-
tive intent with respect to the entire district rested on the defendant
school board. But, while Keyes portends important legal support for
improving the quality of education for minority school children in
northern areas, one cannot help but note the apparent incrementalism
of the Court in adjudicating constitutional rights of black and other
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969) (per curiam).
9. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. School Bd.,
377 U.S. 218 (1964).
10. 402 U.S. 1 (1971), on remand, 362 F. Supp. 1223 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
11. Id. at 31-32 (Burger, C.J.).
12. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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minority children. Specifically, the Court's reluctance to abandon the
de jure/de facto distinction in determining the constitutional rights of
minority school children and the obligations of school districts seriously
retards meaningful adjustments of racial balances in the North. The
Court continues to be unwilling to deal squarely with the inequities
faced by minorites in de facto segregated school systems, although
their effects on minorities are identical to those of de jure segregation.
As a consequence, the Court places on blacks and other minorities
the "initial tortuous effort" of showing segregative intent before con-
stitutional guarantees come into play.13
Two other decisions of the Burger Court may be viewed as support-
ing the interests of black Americans. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co."4
a unanimous Court declared invalid under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964's a standardized intelligence test the practical effect of
which was to bar a disproportionate number of blacks from employ-
ment. Although the test was "neutral," or not intended to discrimi-
nate against blacks, it was not "directed or intended to measure the
ability to learn to perform a particular job or category of jobs." 10
Without a "demonstrable relationship" to job performance, concluded
the Court, any "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to em-
ployment [which] operate invidiously to discriminate" cannot stand.' 7
And in Griffin v. Breckenridge'8 a unanimous Court construed an ear-
lier civil rights statute'9 to permit suits for damages for racially moti-
vated private conspiracies to commit violence in deprivation of civil
rights, despite an earlier decision 20 restricting the statute to conspir-
acies under color of state law.2'
13. Id. at 224 (Powell, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Id. at
215-16 (Douglas, J., concurring).
14. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-15 (1970, Supp. II, 1972).
16. 401 U.S. at 428.
17. Id. at 431. Although since 1965 the employer in Griggs had ceased discrimi-
nating against blacks, the intelligence test had the consequence of freezing blacks in
the same departments. The employer's argument that tests are expressly permitted un-
der § 703(h) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970), was rejected on the ground
that § 703(h) excepted tests "used" to discriminate. The Court thus emphasized that
the standard was to be a practical one: "Congress diverted the thrust of the Act to
the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." 401 U.S. at
432 (emphasis original).
18. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970), formerly ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
20. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1950).
21. At the same time the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute on the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss4/1
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When considered in context, however, the promise of these deci-
sions has been clouded by other actions of the Burger Court. Indeed,
despite these decisions judicial policies toward racial justice generally
appear to have taken on a negative, or at least a more restraining,
tone. For example, Chief Justice Burger himself, in denying a stay
of a lower court desegregation order, somewhat blurred the effect of
the Court's busing decision. 22  In an unusual ten-page memorandum,
he interpreted what the Court had held in Swann. He thought Swann
was being misinterpreted by lower courts which read the decision as
requiring a fixed racial balance or quota. But whatever his intention,
it seems clear that Chief Justice Burger's memorandum softened the
impact of the Court's decision that busing may be used to effect public
school integration. In addition, the Court's attempt to decide the
"city-suburbs" busing issue was left essentially unresolved by a 4-4
deadlock.2 3
Still other actions of the Burger Court give credence to its apparent
trend away from the strong support given blacks by the Warren Court.
For example, in Whitcomb v. Chavis24 the Burger Court rebuffed the
efforts of blacks to gain political representation in the Indiana Legisla-
ture. Blacks had alleged that the Indiana statutes2 5 that established
Marion County (Indianapolis) as a multi-member district for the elec-
tion of state senators and representatives deprived them of a realistic
opportunity to win elections. Specifically, they charged that the laws
invidiously diluted their votes in the predominantly black inner-city
areas of Indianapolis. A three-judge federal district court agreed with
this position." But the Supreme Court overturned the lower court
decision, 6-3, with Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun voting
with the majority. Justice White, who wrote for the Court, said there
was no suggestion that the multi-member district in Marion County
or similar districts in the state were "conceived or operated as purpose-
ful devices to further racial or economic discrimination."2" Justice
basis of the thirteenth amendment and the congressional power to protect the "right
of interstate travel." 403 U.S. at 104-06.
22. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
23. School Bd. v. State Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 92 (1973), aff'g by an equally
divided Court 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972).
24. 403 U.S. 126 (1971). See also Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971).
25. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 34-102, -104 (1969).
26. Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D. Ind. 1969) (three-judge court).
27. 403 U.S. at 150.
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White maintained that "the failure of the ghetto to have legislative
seats in proportion to its population emerges more as a function of
losing elections than of built-in bias against poor Negroes."'2 s He spe-
cifically disagreed with the trial court's view that inner-city voters could
not be adequately or equally represented unless some of Marion Coun-
ty's general assembly seats were reserved for such residents serving
the interests of the inner-city majority. "The mere fact," said Justice
White, "that one interest group or another concerned with the outcome
of Marion County elections has found itself outvoted and without legis-
lative seats of its own provides no basis for invoking constitutional
remedies where, as here, there is no indication that this segment of
the population is being denied access to the political system."20  Fur-
thermore, reasoned Justice White, to uphold the position of one racial
group would make it difficult to reject claims of any other groups-
for example, Republicans, Democrats, or organized labor-who find
themselves similarly disadvantaged. 0
But Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, filed
a strong dissenting opinion in Whitcomb. Justice Douglas supported
the position of the district court that "a showing of racial motivation
is not necessary when dealing with multi-member districts.""1  Justice
Douglas maintained that the test of constitutionality for multi-member
districts is whether there are "invidious effects," and that in this case
the test was met by a showing of (1) an identifiable voting group;
(2) discrepancies of representation between middle and lower class
townships; (3) the "pervasive influence of the county organizations
of the political parties;" and (4) the "undifferentiated positions" of
legislators on political issues. 32  Justice Douglas compared multi-
28. Id. at 153.
29. Id. at 154-55. In Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), the Court had in-
dicated that multi-member districts are not per se unconstitutional. In Burns v. Rich-
ardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), the Court stated that multi-member districts must "mini-
mize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting pop-
ulation," id. at 88, to violate the equal protection clause. Despite Burns, and the ma-
jority's recognition in Whitcomb that multi-member districts have a "tendency to sub-
merge minorities," 403 U.S. at 159, the Court found multi-member districting no more
inherently unfair than single-member districting.
30. 403 U.S. at 154-55. See generally Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral Districts
-Do They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle?, 75 YALE L.J. 1309 (1966);
Hamilton, Legislative Constituencies: Single-Member Districts, Multi-Member Districts,
and Floterial Districts, 20 W. POL. Q. 321 (1967).
31. 403 U.S. at 178 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 179.
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member districting to gerrymandering in that both "dilute" or "sur-
round" the minority vote, causing the requisite segregative effect. He
concluded, "Our cases since Baker v. Carr have never intimated that
'one man, one vote' meant 'one white man, one vote.' "3
Further evidence of eroding judicial support for civil rights interests
was reflected by the Burger Court in Palmer v. Thompson.3 4  By a
5-4 vote, the Court refused to force the city of Jackson, Mississippi
to reopen its municipal swimming pools after the city closed them fol-
lowing a district court's determination that operating them on a racially
segregated basis was unconstitutional. 35 The Court based its decision
on evidence that the city had closed the pools because they could not
be economically or safely operated on an integrated basis. The dis-
senting opinion of Justice White deserves particular mention.3 6  Jus-
tice White made specific reference to the fact that though he had
spoken for the majority only a week earlier in Whitcomb3 7 he now
found himself at odds with four of the Justices38 who supported his
opinion in that case. To Justice White, the closing of swimming pools
in Jackson, unlike the multi-member district scheme in Indiana, was
an obvious attempt to perpetuate racial segregation.3 9  However, it was
left to Justice Thurgood Marshall, the only black ever to serve on the
Court, to put the matter in sharp perspective: "By effectively remov-
ing publicly owned swimming pools from the protection of the Four-
33. Id. at 180. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1966); Gomillion v. Light-
foot, 364 U.S. 339 (1964). Justice Douglas met the argument that correcting the In-
diana system would require the curing of the gerrymandering of any special interest
group, by pointing out that the "Constitution has a special thrust when it comes to
voting; the Fifteenth Amendment says the right of citizens to vote shall not be
'abridged' on account of 'race, color, or previous condition of servitude."' 403 U.S.
at 180.
34. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
35. Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539 (E.D. Miss. 1962), afj'd, 313 F.2d 637
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
36. 403 U.S. at 240 (White, J., dissenting).
37. See notes 24-33 supra and accompanying text.
38. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black, Stewart, and Blackmun.
39. 403 U.S. at 240-41 (White, J., dissenting):
[Tihe city is adhering to an unconstitutional policy and is implementing it
by abandoning the facilities. It will not do in such circumstances to say that
whites and Negroes are being treated alike because both are denied use of
public services. The fact is that closing the pools is an expression of official
policy that Negroes are unfit to associate with whites. Closing pools to pre-
vent interracial swimming is little different from laws or customs forbidding
Negroes and whites from eating together or from cohabiting or intermarry-
ing.
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teenth Amendment... the majority and concurring opinions turn the
clock back 17 years [to the situation prior to Brown]."4
Some of the strongest clues of the increasingly negative judicial pos-
ture toward civil rights are provided in two 1972 decisions in which
all four Nixon appointees participated. In Wright v. Council of
City of Emporia4 a bare 5-4 majority followed the strong pro-civil rights
stance of the Warren Court. But perhaps most significant is that the
entire five-man majority consisted of holdovers from the Warren Court
while the four dissenters-Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Black-
mun, Powell, and Rehnquist-were Nixon appointees. This marked
the first dissent from a majority ruling on school desegregation since
the 1954 Brown decision.4" In Wright the "holdover" majority en-
joined a city from setting up a separate school system in a context
where the separation might adversely affect an existing desegregation
order from a federal court to dismantle a dual school system on a coun-
ty-wide basis. "Only when it became clear," said Justice Stewart for
the majority, "that segregation in the county system was finally to be
abolished did Emporia attempt to take its children out of the county
system. 43  The majority focused again on the practical effect of the
city's withdrawal on the overall desegregation plan, rather than on the
specific intent of the city.44
Chief Justice Burger wrote for the four dissenters. His focus con-
cerned the limits of judicial power and the discretion that must be
left to local authorities. "A local school board plan," wrote the Chief
Justice, "that will eliminate dual schools, stop discrimination and im-
prove the quality of education ought not to be cast aside because a
judge can evolve some other plan that accomplishes the same result
or what he considers a preferable result. . . .Such an approach gives
controlling weight to sociological theories [but] not constitutional doc-
trine. ,45
40. Id. at 272 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
42. See Graham, 4 Nixon Appointees End Court's School Unanimity, N.Y. Times,
June 23, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
43. 407 U.S. at 459.
44. This emphasis was in contrast to lower federal courts' examination of purpose
in determining whether local authorities have acted permissibly in desegregation cases.
E.g., Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 448 F-2d 746 (5th Cir. 1971); Bush v. Or-
leans Parish School Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La. 1960), aff'd mem., 365 U.S. 569
(1961).
45. 407 U.S. at 477 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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The other 1972 ruling that suggests the emerging posture of the
Burger Court toward civil rights is Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,48
in which the Court majority, including all four Nixon appointees, con-
strued the "state action" doctrine so as to uphold a private club's re-
fusal to serve blacks despite state issuance of a liquor license to the
club. The decision broke the trend of the Warren years by limiting
the application of the "state action" doctrine, under which the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment may not be invoked
without a sufficient level of state activity in the alleged denial of equal
protection of the laws.47 While it could have found the requisite state
involvement in the state's discretionary control over liquor licensees, 4
the majority chose to emphasize that the state did not influence the
club's policies on serving guests and therefore did not encourage the
club's discrimination.
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall thought otherwise. To Jus-
tice Brennan, for example, the liquor licensing laws involve the state
in such detail with the licensee's business that "when Moose Lodge
obtains its liquor license, the State of Pennsylvania becomes an active
participant in the operation of the Lodge Bar." This involvement was
especially disturbing to Justice Brennan since to him "something is
uniquely amiss in a society where the government, the authoritative
oracle of community values, involves itself in racial discrimination."49
11
The Burger Court has also rendered decisions in the areas of pov-
46. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
47. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Turner v. City of Mem-
phis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author., 365 U.S. 715
(1961). See generally Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Ac-
lion" Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855 (1966).
48. This was the holding of the district court. Irvis v. Scott, 318 F. Supp. 1246
(M.D. Pa. 1970) (three-judge court). The question is one of degree; as Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the six-man majority, pointed out,
The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by an othervise
private entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private
entity receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the state, or if it
is subject to state regulation in any degree whatever. Since state-furnished
services include such necessities of life as electricity, water, and police and
fire protection, such a holding would utterly emasculate the distinction be-
tween private as distinguished from state conduct ....
407 U.S. at 173. The Court distinguished earlier "state action" cases as reflecting state
involvement in the ostensibly private discriminatory practice under attack, and found
insufficient or "neutral" state activity in Moose Lodge.
49. 407 U.S. at 184-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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erty and criminal law which have significant impact on black Ameri-
cans.50 In general, these decisions indicate that the Burger Court is
not disposed to break new ground in what had been areas of expand-
ing rights for minorities. The issue in James v. Valtlerra,"' for ex-
ample, was whether an amendment to the California constitution 2
which provided for mandatory popular referenda on low-rent housing
proposals, violated the equal protection clause of the Federal Consti-
tution. A three-judge district court 3 had enjoined enforcement of the
amendment, relying chiefly on Hunter v. Erickson,"4 in which the
Court held that a referendum law violated equal protection by requir-
ing that any ordinance which regulated real property on the basis of
race, color, religion, or national origin must be approved by a majority
of qualified voters. The Burger Court distinguished Hunter on the
ground that California's referendum provision did not rest on "distinc-
tions based on race;" 55 instead, the amendment "requires referendum
approval for any low rent housing project, not only for projects which
will be occupied by a racial minority."'50 Further, wrote Justice Black
for the majority, the record "would not support any claim that a law
seemingly neutral on its face is in fact aimed at a racial minority."5 7
Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justice Brennan and, interest-
ingly, by one of the then-two Nixon appointees, Justice Blackmun. To
Justice Marshall, the California amendment created an invidious dis-
tinction between rich and poor which, particularly since it should be
subject to "closer scrutiny" as a "suspect classification,"58 violated
50. See generally E. TUCKER, ADJUMICATION OF SOCIAL ISSUES (1971).
51. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229
(1969).
52. CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1 provides:
No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or ac-
quired in any manner by any state public body until a majority of the quali-
fied electors of the city, town or county, as the case may be, in which it
is proposed to develop, construct, or acquire the same, voting upon such issue,
approve such project by voting in favor thereof at an election to be held for
that purpose, or at any general or special election.
53. Valtierra v. James, 313 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (three-judge court).
54. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
55. 402 U.S. at 141.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 144-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting), citing McDonald v. Board of Election,
394 U.S. 802 (1969), Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), and
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969).
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equal protection. The distinction which troubled Justice Marhsall was
that only projects for persons "of low income" must obtain prior ap-
proval. And, while none of the Justices discussed the possibility, Cali-
fornia's scheme of involving local judgment in the location of federally
assisted housing may permit racial majorities to maintain patterns of
racial housing-patterns which make meaningful "equal protection"
extremely unlikely.
The poor did not fare any better in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,19 a 1973 decision. In Rodriguez the Court re-
jected challenges to the local property tax system that provides a sig-
nificant part of public school finances in forty-nine of the fifty states.
The contention was that the Texas system of supplementing state aid
to school districts by means of an ad valorem tax on property within
the jurisdiction of the individual school district violated the equal pro-
tection clause. Rodriguez, whose children attended schools in a dis-
trict with lower per pupil expenditures but higher property tax rates
than in other area districts, argued that substantial differences in per
pupil expenditures among the districts resulted from differences in the
value of property taxed within each district. Speaking for a 5-4 ma-
jority, Justice Powell said that the financing system, although not per-
fect, "abundantly satisfies" the constitutional standard for equal protec-
tion since the system "rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose
or interest,"60 namely, the maintenance of local control of public edu-
cation. Justice Powell applied the traditional equal protection stand-
ard since "the Texas system does not operate to the peculiar disad-
vantage of any suspect class," 61 and since education, although an im-
portant state service, is not a "fundamental" right because it is not
"explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." '62
59. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
60. Id. at 50.
61. Id. at 22. This conclusion was based on the inconclusiveness of evidence that
there was a correlation between the property tax base in absence of proof that the
quality of education was deficient even where expenditures were lowest. Id. at 20-
24. As Justice Marshall pointed out in dissent, id. at 95, however, "it is inequality-
not some notion of gross inadequacy-of educational opportunity that raises a question
of denial of equal protection of the laws."
62. Id. at 36. While education is not explicitly guaranteed in the Federal Constitu-
tion, it is so guaranteed by many state constitutions. These provisions have provided
the basis for relief against inequitable property tax assessments and expenditures in sev-
eral states. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601 (1971); Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972).
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Justices Brennan, White, Douglas, and Marshall dissented. Justice
Marshall's dissent was especially strong. He called the Court's deci-
sion "a retreat from our historic commitment to equality of educational
opportunity" and an "unsupportable acquiescence in a system which
deprives children in their earliest years of the chance to reach their
full potential as citizens. '68  He emphasized the disparities in per pupil
expenditures and tax rates among the districts involved. In addition,
he sharply attacked the majority's attempt "to force this case into the
same category for purposes of equal protection analysis as decisions
involving discrimination affecting commercial interests. '0 4  "By so do-
ing," said Justice Marshall, "the majority singles this case out for treat-
ment at odds with what seems to me to be the clear trend of recent
decisions. . . and thereby ignores the constitutional importance of the
interest at stake and the invidiousness of the particular classification,
factors that call for far more than lenient scrutiny of the Texas finan-
cing scheme which the majority pursues."' 0 Justice Marshall insisted
that if the discrimination inherent in the Texas scheme is scrutinized
with the care demanded by the interest and classification involved, the
unconstitutionality of the scheme is "unmistakable." 0
Rodriguez, while not posed in racial terms, has a direct impact on
equality of opportunity for racial minorities, which tend to be concen-
trated in areas where property values are lower and where conse-
quently, regardless of the willingness in some of these areas to pay
a substantial rate of tax for education, less money can be made avail-
able for educational services.67
The Burger Court has also considered the protections afforded wel-
fare recipients. At issue before the Court in Wyman v. James,8 for
example, was whether a welfare recipient must permit a social worker
to visit her home as a condition of eligibility for benefits under the
63. 411 U.S. at 97.
64. Id. at 98. Justice Marshall has long been a critic of the Court's "rigidified"
two-tier system of analyzing equal protection arguments. See Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U.S. 78, 90 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall, I., dissenting).
65. 411 U.S. at 99.
66. Id. at 101.
67. See L. Fox & G. HuRD, FINANCES OF LARGE-CITY SCHOOL SYSTEMS: A Com-
PARATIV N ANALYSIS 1-35 (1971); U.S. PREsIDEN's CoMM'N ON SCHOOL FINANCE, FINAL
REPORT, SCHOOLS, PEOPLE, AND MONEY: THE NEED FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 4046
(1972).
68. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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program of Aid to Families of Dependent Children."9 On the basis
of past decisions,70 chances appeared good that the Court would knock
down home visit requirements. But Justice Blackmun, who spoke for
the Court majority, viewed home visits by social workers as a "reason-
able administrative tool" that served a valid purpose and did not un-
constitutionally infringe on the right of privacy or any other rights guar-
anteed by the fourth amendment. 71 "The caseworker," said Justice
Blackmun, "is not a sleuth but rather, we trust, is a friend to one in
need."7 2
The dissenters-Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas-reacted
sharply. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, charged the ma-
jority with ignoring an "unbroken line of cases," and said he could
not understand "why a commercial warehouse deserves more protec-
tion than does this poor woman's home. 73  "This Court," observed
Marshall, "has occasionally pushed beyond established constitutional
contours to protect the vulnerable and to further basic human values."
He concluded, "I find no little irony in the fact that the burden of
today's departure from principled adjudication is placed upon the lowly
poor."74  Justice Douglas' dissent was equally sharp: "Is the search
of [the welfare recipient's] home without a warrant made 'reasonable'
merely because she is dependent on government largesse? ...
[Clonstitutional rights-here the privacy of the home-are obviously
not dependent on the poverty or on the affluence of the beneficiary.
It is the precincts of the home that the Fourth Amendment protects,
and their privacy is as important to the lowly as to the mighty. '75  The
majority and dissenting Justices thus revealed a basic difference in atti-
tude about the role of constitutional protections in the lives of the poor.
The Burger Court rendered several other decisions with respect to
welfare recipients. For example, the Court held that welfare benefits
are a matter of statutory entitlement that may not be terminated with-
out procedural due process.70 On the other hand, in Dandridge v.
Williams77 the Court upheld a Maryland statute which limited welfare
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-06 (1970).
70. E.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
71. 400 U.S. at 326.
72. Id. at 323.
73. Id. at 347 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 331-32 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis original).
76. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
77. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See also Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).Washington University Open Scholarship
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payments to a single family unit to a maximum of $250 per month
regardless of the size of the family. In general, however, the thrust of
the activity of the Burger Court appears to counter what looms as the
key issue in this developing area of the law, that is, whether poor
people are, or should be, entitled to some minimal level of protection,
as a matter of right, against economic deprivation.7"
Still other decisions of the Burger Court relate to the access of poor
people to courts in civil litigation. In Boddie v. Connecticut,79 for
example, the Court held that states cannot deny access to their courts
to persons seeking divorce solely because of inability to pay court
costs.80 But in United States v. Kras81 the Court held that Boddie
was inapplicable as precedent when the issue involved the inability
of an unemployed indigent to pay a $50 filing fee in a federal bank-
ruptcy petition. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun inter-
preted Boddie as requiring both that the interest sought to be pro-
tected must be "fundamental," and that there be no effective alterna-
tive available to the prospective litigant. Since one seeking bank-
ruptcy seeks no "fundamental" right, and may have his debts dis-
charged without judicial assistance, due process is not violated by
charging a filing fee as a condition to an adjudication of bankruptcy.8"
78. This thrust comes through with particular force in Justice Powell's discussion in
Rodriguez of Dandridge and Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), in which he
concludes: "It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional
rights iA the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws." 411 U.S. at 26. See
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword. On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HAv. L. REv. 7, 42 (1969); Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965);
Ryan, Decent Housing as a Constitutional Right, 14 HowARD L.J. 338 (1968). See also
Krislov, The OEO Lawyers Fail to Constitutionalize a Right to Welfare: A Study in
the Uses and Limits of the .udicial Process, 58 MINN. L. Rnv. 211 (1973).
79. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
80. The Court found that since Connecticut law required a judicial proceeding to
terminate a marriage, its "refusal to admit [those incapable of paying fees] to its courts
. .. must be regarded as the equivalent of denying them an opportunity to be heard
upon their claimed right to a dissolution of their marriages, and, in the absence of
a sufficient countervailing justification for the State's action, a denial of due process."
Id. at 380-81.
81. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
82. Justice Marshall, dissenting, indicated that Boddie established access to the
courts itself as a fundamental right which cannot be denied on the basis of poverty.
Id. at 457 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart's dissent argued that while Boddle
did not open the courts to indigents under all circumstances, neither did it require that
the interest be "fundamental" for the indigent to gain free access to the judicial process.
Id. at 455-57 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas argued that all fling fees cre-
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The Kras majority's reading of Boddie will likely have the effect of
preventing any expansion of the Boddie rationale to any but a few
classes of litigation and, as a practical matter, will prevent a significant
number of poor black Americans from initiating judicial proceedings
to vindicate their rights.8 3
The Burger Court has also blunted the thrust of Warren Court deci-
sions with respect to the rights of persons accused of crime. In Harris
v. New Yorks4 the Court, Chief Justice Burger writing for a 5-4 ma-
jority, held that statements of an accused obtained by police in viola-
tion of Miranda rules, 5 provided the statements were made voluntar-
ily, could be used to attack the credibility of a defendant if he took
the stand, although they were not admissible as evidence of the de-
fendant's guilt. Indeed, wrote Chief Justice Burger, once he has
taken the witness stand, the defendant has an obligation to tell the
truth, and "the prosecution. . did no more than utilize the traditional
truth-testing devices of the adversary process. . . . The shield pro-
vided by Miranda," concluded Burger, "cannot be perverted into a
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from risk of confron-
tation with prior inconsistent utterances. '8 6  But Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, thought the Court had "ser-
ate a classification based on wealth which violates equal protection. Id. at 457-58
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
83. To illustrate, in another 1973 case, Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973),
the Court upheld the imposition of a $25 filing fee as a condition of obtaining review
of administrative action affecting welfare recipients in Oregon, and cited Kras rather
than Boddie as authority. The Court, as it had in Kras, weighed the constitutional
significance of the interest of the prospective litigant, and found that it was not "funda-
mental." On the second issue of available alternatives, the Court cited the welfare
recipients' opportunities for administrative hearings. Id. at 660.
The Kras dissenters again dissented in Ortwein. As Justice Douglas put it, the ma-
jority's decision simply "broadens and fortifies the 'private preserve' for the affluent
[by upholding] a scheme of judicial review whereby justice remains a luxury for the
wealthy." Id. at 663 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The uncertainty of the effect of Kras and Ortwein on the Boddie rationale is aug-
mented by two other Burger Court decisions, in which pre-judgment garnishment pro-
cedures, Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and the seizure of prop-
erty of defaulting debtors without notice and hearing, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67(1972), were declared unconstitutional as denials of due process. See generally D.
CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1967).
84. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
85. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Warren Court held that
statements elicited from an accused who has not been advised of his rights to remain
silent and to an attorney are inadmissible against him at trial to establish guilt.
86. 401 U.S. at 225-26.
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iously undermined" Miranda. "The Court today," wrote Justice Bren-
nan, "tells the police that they may freely interrogate an accused in-
communicado and without counsel and know that although any state-
ment they obtain in violation of Miranda can't be used on the state's
direct case, it may be introduced if the defendant has the temerity
to testify in his own defense, This goes far toward undoing much
of the progress made in conforming police methods to the Constitu-
tion." 87
Other erimial cases illustrate the Court's support of President Nix-
ol's pledge to strengthen society's "peace forces" against the "criminal
forces." For example, even though the Court found capital punish-
ment unconstitutional, s8 it should be noted that all four Nixon ap-
pointees dissented. Moreover, though a unanimous Court expanded
the right to counsel to apply to misdemeanor cases,"' it also shored
up the discretion of authorities before indictment or formal charges
are brought. And it is at this stage--after arrest but prior to
formal charges-that blacks and others can experience their great-
est difficulties with law enforcement officers. For example, the Court
held that a suspect in a police lineup is not entitled to counsel if he
has not been formally indicted.e0 Also, the Court approved the right
of a policeman to stop and frisk a suspect even if the officer's suspi-
cion is based on information supplied by an unnamed informant.0z
Still further, the Court allowed an unconstitutional pretrial confession
to be admitted against a criminal defendant as evidence, brushing aside
the unconstitutional taint as "harmless error" on the ground that the
jury had independent and sufficient evidence to convict.0 2  In eadh
of these cases all four Nixon appointees were included in the majority.
In addition, Johnson v. Louisiana,98 one of the 1972 non-unanhnious
jury verdict cases, illustrates vividly the implications of the Burger
Court's "law and order" decisions for blacks and other identifiable
minorities. In Johnson the Court, with all Nixon appointees in agree-
87. Id. at 232 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. Furman v, Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (197-). The failure of any two of the con-
curring Justices to agree on a rationale in Furman leaves the future of capital punish-
ment in doubt, for example, where, unlike Furman, its imposition is not discretionary.
89. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
90. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
91. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), CI. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968). See also United States v. Robinson, 94 S, Ct. 467 (1973).
92. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
93. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss4/1
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ment, upheld non-unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases. The
Court held that a verdict of guilty or not guilty returned by nine of
twelve jurors did not deprive the defendant of due process or equal
protection." The basis of the majority's holding was that permitting
non-unanimous convictions serves the valid state objective of" 'Facilitat-
[ing], expedit[ing], and reduc[ing] expense in the administration of
criminal justice . . . .' " However, four of the remaining five War-
ren Court Justices-Brennan, Douglas, Stewart, and Marshall--dis-
sented. Questioning whether the decision amounted to a "watered
down" version of the Bill of Rights, Justice Douglas observed that "these
civil rights-whether they concern speech, searches and seizures, self-
incrimination, criminal prosecution, bail, or cruel and unusual punish-
ment-extend of course to everyone, but in cold reality touch mostly
the lower castes in our society. I refer of course," said Justice Douglas,
"to the blacks, the Chicanos, the one-mule farmers, the agricultural
workers, the off beat students, the victims of the ghetto." '96 In a similar
vein, Justice Brennan observed:
When verdicts must be unanimous, no member of the jury may be ig-
nored by the others. When less then unanimity is sufficient, considera-
tion of minority views may become nothing more than a matter of ma-
jority grace. In my opinion, the right of all groups in this Nation to
participate in the criminal process means the right to have their voices
heard. A unanimous verdict vindicates that right. Majority verdicts
could destroy it.97
On the other side of the ledger, certain Burger Court decisions have
served to bolster rights of indigents in the criminal justice system. In
the main, however, these decisions support the rights of indigents after
conviction. For example, the Court ruled that a state could not sen-
tence an indigent to jail for failure to pay a fine or court costs in a
lump sum if the consequent time in jail would exceed the maximum
jail term set by statute for the particular crime.98 Indigents must be
offered some alternative to lump sum payment of fines, such as install-
ment payments. Still further, the Court held that in view of the equal
94. In another case decided the same day, the Court upheld a ten-to-two jury con-
viction as not violating the sixth amendment. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972).
95. 406 U.S. at 364, quoting State v. Lewis, 129 La. 800, 804, 56 So. 893, 894
(1911).
96. Id. at 387 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 396 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
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protection clause of the fourteenth amendment an indigent cannot
be compelled to "work out" traffic fines by spending time in jail. 9
Generally, the decisional output of the Burger Court has been
mixed; while there is some continuity between Warren Court policies
and those of the Burger Court-for example, on school desegrega-
tion-there are also increasing signs of toning down and departing
from these and other policies. With respect to criminal procedures,
for example, the Burger Court is apparently disposed to minimize or
reduce the rights of those interacting with administrative bureaucracies
(police) until litigation is initiated, at which time the Court will appar-
ently uphold traditional constitutional values such as the right to coun-
sel. The practical consequences of this trend, if it continues, are ob-
vious, for it is this daily interaction with bureaucracies that determines
the quality of life (repressive or less so) for many persons, especially
blacks. Of course, at this early stage of comparison, there are certain
organizational and functional characteristics of the Court, such as con-
tinuing input by holdover Justices from the Warren Court and allegi-
ance to precedent, that tend to blunt any abrupt policy changes. None-
theless, even at this stage some change is evident
I
This review of judicial policies indicates a discernible change in
substance and tone between the decisional output of the Warren Court
and that of the Burger Court. Indeed, Professor Kurland's intended
pun that "the [Court's] shift has not been . . . a simple change from
black to white"10 seems to have already lost its punch. Changes in
Court personnel are certainly bringing about a change in the judicial
stance toward the constitutional rights of blacks. This is not to say
that the Warren Court was the great "white savior" of black Ameri-
cans;101 that would overstate what that Court did or what any Court
actually could do. Nor is it to say that the Burger Court has not sup-
ported certain rights of blacks. In some instances the Court has done
so. But it is to say that what the Burger Court has done thus far,
when considered in context, indicates that the legal fate of problems
confronting black Americans is much more uncertain than it was dur-
99. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
100. Kurland, supra note 1, at 265.
101. See Steele, Nine Men in Black Who Think White, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1968,
§ 5 (Magazine), at 56-57, 112-22.
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ing the Warren Court. What we have observed here indicates that
we may expect: (1) less inclination on the part of the Court to apply
or to expand judicial policies supporting racial justice; (2) less support
for blacks and others who wish to use litigation to achieve objectives
which they cannot attain in political forums; and (3) less judicial sup-
port for individual or group claims as against governmental authority.
These directions, if continued, could hold important implications for
blacks and the political system.
First, a perpetuation and extension of certain decisional outputs of
the Burger Court could weaken one of the most vital points of access
that blacks have to the political system. Indeed, one of the chief func-
tions assumed by the Warren Court was to articulate and respond to
certain key demands of those who were unpopular, unrepresented, or
underrepresented in the political system.' The characteristics of the
American judiciary, as opposed to Congress and the Presidency, seem
unique to this function. Particularly, the insulation of the federal judi-
ciary from the pressures of conforming to majority will makes judges
more likely to protect minority rights. It seems much too late in the
day to argue whether the judiciary should respond to minority de-
mands. The fact is that judges are a part of the political process "not
by choice, but by function." 103
In any event, the problems that affect blacks and press the govern-
mental system for solution are anything but frivolous. They are the
great issues of our time, which, as De Tocqueville observed long ago,
sooner or later are resolved into judicial issues.' 04 The American po-
litical system, as it has evolved, demonstrates an enormous proclivity
to translate economic and social conflicts into legal conflicts. This pro-
pensity of the American system, it seems, accounts for the unique sig-
nificance of the Supreme Court. Consider the kinds of major issues
that occupied the Warren Court: (1) how to overcome problems of
racial injustice; (2) how to strengthen and extend political democracy,
for example, fair and effective systems of representation; (3) how to
ensure fairness to all persons in the administration of criminal justice;
(4) how to safeguard the rights of the poor in the distribution of legal,
political, and economic benefits; and (5) how to give maximum pro-
102. See M. SHAPiRo, FREEDoM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 5-45 (1966).
103. J. PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS IN TEI POLITICAL PROCESS 3 (1955).
104. See id. at 1.
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tection to individual freedoms.10 5
As to all these problems, it seems quite obvious that the prevailing,
dominant interests are unlikely to be in the vanguard of change.
Hence, those who are the victims of these problems-the politically
disadvantaged-would quite naturally turn to the judicial system where
numbers, social status, wealth, and influence presumably have less
bearing on decisional outcomes. 106 In short, one of the important con-
tributions of the Warren Court is that it was in a position to place
items important to such groups on its institutional agenda,107 and deal
with them. Among the consequences of these actions was the placement
of the symbol of constitutionalism and law on the side of such interests.
As a result, blacks were able initially to circumvent many of the
defects of coalition-building and isolationism that so often characterize
minority group politics. Coalition politics, for example, would appear
to be necessary for a minority group to achieve favorable policies in
the majority-rule-oriented electoral system. But to gain coalition sup-
port a minority more often than not must temper its original objectives,
since failure to do so lessens the possibilities of success in coalition-
building. Alternatively, a minority may hold to its original objectives
but find itself isolated without the support necessary to achieve suc-
cess. Then again, the minority group may subscribe to general, am-
biguous,"" though favorable policies which either postpone the specific
goals or shift their realization to another arena. This is the more
plausible course for a minority group such as blacks to follow in elec-
tive-political arenas, since its objectives are more likely to involve mat-
ters that affect the very self-esteem and dignity of individuals and the
group itself. Hence, it would be most difficult for the group to temper
105. For a discussion of basic issues facing the Warren Court as well as a gener-
ally sympathetic commentary on that Court, see A. Cox, supra note 2, at 1-23.
106. But in too many instances this presumption defies hard evidence. See, e.g.,
Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DUKn L.J. 19; Bums, Can A Black Man Get a
Fair Trial in This Country?, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 5; Crock-
ett, Racism in the Courts, 20 J. PuB. L. 385 (1971); Nagel, The Tipped Scales of
American Justice, TRANSACTION MAG. 1, 3-9 (May-June 1966); Sellin, Race Prejudices
in the Administration of Justice, 41 AM. J. Soc. 212 (1935).
107. See generally R. CoB & C. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS:
Tim DYNrAICS OF AGENDA-BUILDING (1972).
108. See generally E. KELLEY & M. LEISERSON, THE STUDY OF COALITION BEHAVIOR
(1970); Brains, Positive Coalition Theory: The Relationship Between Postulated Goals
and Derived Behavior, in POLITICAL SCIENCE ANNUAL 3 (C. Cotter ed. 1973); Shepsle,
The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition, 66 AM. POL. Sci.
REv. 550, 555-59, 567-68 (1972).
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its original objectives, and equally difficult for the group to hold to
its original objectives in isolation without any viable chance of even
limited success.
The judicial process potentially offers a minority group a way to
overcome certain limitations inherent in the elective-political proc-
ess.' In the judicial process a minority group may push its objectives
undiluted to obtain the fullness of specific constitutional-legal guar-
antees. Moreover, the entire judicial drama, though not aloof from
politics, is carried on in a strictly "non-political" manner, in a language
that addresses outcomes in terms of what the Constitution-and justice
and fairness---"command." "Reasoned argument" and "legal prin-
ciples" replace hortatory language and majority rule as the "critical"
determinants. The "myth" I" and structure of the judicial forum, as
opposed to the practice and structure of elective-political forums like
Congress, enhance minority group chances of success. In addition,
since courts also serve important functions for political elites and the
political system generally-for example, resolution of conflict in terms
of "law and order"---a victory for a minority group in the judicial sys-
tem takes on added significance. Specifically, favorable court action
may serve to increase and constitutionalize (legitimize) pressures on
and in elective-political institutions to deal with the issues involved.
Indeed, the minority group may now, as a result of victory in the
courts, seek to implement constitutional-legal rights, not mere interest
group objectives. This, in large measure, is what happened during
the Warren Court.
Today, however, the situation is different. The Supreme Court's
leadership and strong support for civil rights and civil liberties no
longer exist. Whereas decisions of the Warren Court embodied a
creative use and application of law to stimulate basic policy changes,
the Burger Court shows no such inclination. An off-the-bench com-
ment by Chief Justice Burger is suggestive of this shift in the direction
of the Court."' "Those [young people] who decide to go into law
primarily on the theory that they can change the world by litigation
in the courts," cautioned the Chief Justice, "may be in for some dis-
109. Of course, there is some evidence of coalition activity in judicial decision-mak-
ing, but the resources needed to forge winning coalitions appear to be different. See
generally W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964).
110. See Skogan, Judicial Myth and Judicial Reality, 1971 WAsH. U.L.Q. 309, 314-
21.
111. N.Y. Times, July 4, 1971, at 24, col. 6.
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appointments.""' 2 Litigation, he said, is not "the route by which basic
changes in a country like ours should be made. That is a legislative
and policy process, part of the political process," he continued, "and
there is a very limited role for courts in this respect. 11 3
Already it appears that the character of this "limited role" is being
charted by decisions of the Burger Court. Where the law seems
"well-settled" the Court is likely to base its decisions on existing prin-
ciples with marginal discretion for change (in either direction), for
example, in school desegregation where state action (or inaction) is
manifest. On the other hand, where 'the law seems "unsettled," the
Court is likely to opt for "judicial restraint" or "non-involvement," for
example, in cases that turn on the "state action"-"private action" dis-
tinction, and in litigation seeking new legal supports to strengthen and
expand the constitutional rights of blacks and the poor. If this posture
of the Burger Court continues, the problem for blacks will not be how
to forge new changes through litigation, but rather how to prevent the
"chipping away" of legal supports already gained.
Secondly, given the nature of the political system, it seems unlikely
that leadership with respect to civil rights and related problems can
be expected from elective-political institutions."14  This observation
finds strong support in Professor Dawson's study of 1968 and 1970
Survey Research Center public opinion data relative to governmental
action in certain policy areas.115 Dawson argues that "increased inten-
sity and polarization of opinions regarding government race relation
policies, the relatively small proportion of blacks in the population,
and the increasing divisions within the Democratic Party over race re-
lated issues make it increasingly difficult to deal with the issues of
racial equality and integration through the normal electoral system and
policy making processes."" 6  Put another way, elective-political insti-
tutions, in large measure, respond to constituencies that have the re-
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. For commentary on the inability of the political system to deal with these
problems, see I. BuRNs, UNCOMMON SENSE (1972); T. LOwi, TE END OF LIBERALISM
(1969). See also W. BURNIAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPIUNO o AmERI-
CAN POLITICS 91-193 (1970). For an intriguing discussion of reforms geared to the
black community, see Zangrando & Zangrando, Law, the American Value System, and
the Black Community, 3 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 32, 39-44 (1971).
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sources necessary to win elections. These resources include votes, fi-
nancial wealth, support from influential groups, and so on. The only
resource that blacks have in potentially adequate supply is votes.
However, even if blacks should achieve maximum voting strength, this
would not be enough to balance the scale, much less assure favorable
action from elective-political institutions.
While more active political participation such as voting and holding
public office appears desirable, I do not think we ought to build expec-
tations about such activity beyond what we might reasonably expect.
Reliance on political participation as the primary way to rectify basic
socio-political and legal problems must be tempered by the limitations
inherent in American electoral politics. This latter point, as well as
the overall efficacy of elective-political institutions in dealing with ra-
cial problems, is illuminated vividly in a study by Professor Mack Jones
on black officeholders in the South. 117 "While voting and holding of-
fice are necessary conditions," writes Jones, "they are not sufficient
ones for realization of the democratic creed." s  This suggests, for
example, that more than emergent black political majorities and
elected officials in the nation's central cities may be needed for blacks
to receive the full benefits of American society." 9 The authority and
resources which cities need to deal with the problems involved make
them greatly dependent, as the system presently operates, upon insti-
tutions beyond their control, such as state and federal legislatures. This
situation has led one scholar to conclude that future control of central
cities appears to offer blacks "very limited" opportunities for gains and
may well prove a "hollow prize."' 2  But this need not be the case.
The unique role and powers of the judiciary, symbolized by the Su-
preme Court during the Warren era, could prove determinative in
these circumstances.
117. M. Jones, Black Officeholders in Local Governments of the South: An Over-
view (paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, 1970).
118. Id, at 38.
119. For an incisive commentary on the problems and prospects facing black elected
officials in dealing with urban problems, see Friesema, Black Control of Central Cities:
The Holloaw Prize, 35 J. Am. INST. PLANNERS 75 (1969). For searing commentary
on the problems which face a black mayor (and in many ways, problems common to
elected executives generally), see C. SToKEs, PROMISES OF POWER: A POLTCAL AUTo-
BiocRAPHY 118-20 (1973).
120. See Friesema, supra note 119.
769
Washington University Open Scholarship
770 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1973:747
It could very well be that given the nature and operation of the
American political system, strong judicial support' 21-similar to and
even more than that given by the Warren Court-is one of the neces-
sary conditions for the full realization of the "democratic creed" by
minority groups such as blacks. The Court has had a long history
of impeding and retarding the constitutional rights of blacks, even
when faced with strong congressional support of that objective. 122
Even in relatively recent times, decisions of the Court offered only
marginal support for black interests.' 23 As long as the Court impeded
black interests or supported them only marginally, nothing much was
done to improve the status of blacks. But once the Court began ren-
dering decisions that strongly supported and expanded the constitu-
tional rights of blacks, the situation began to change. Impetus was
given to the civil rights movement, support for its objectives was broad-
ened, and Congress and the President began to take action to deal
with the problems of racial injustice. Initiatives taken by the Warren
Court stand out as crucial in the stimulation and development of pol-
icies designed to overcome these problems.
Viewed from an overall perspective, the decisions of the Warren
Court suggest that safeguarding constitutional rights of a minority
group such as blacks requires the Court to do more than just police
the process by which public policies are made;124 it must also judge
the output of that process. 2 The basic need for such judicial action
121. Of course, there may be other types of non-elective institutions that could pro-
vide such support:
We might find . . . that certain issues simply do not lend themselves to fair
resolution by elective-political institutions no matter how much we tell our-
selves that they do. The alternative, in such situations, is not necessarily a
total reliance upon the judiciary. Independent administrative commissions,
for example, might prove highly satisfactory in arriving at fair and equitable
solutions.
Barker, Third Parties in Litigation: A Systematic View of the Judicial Function, 29 J.
PoLITIs 41, 66 (1967).
122. E.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). For a popular and searing com-
mentary on this negative posture of the Court, see Steele, supra note 101, at 56-57,
112-22. For a scholarly and meticulous documentation of the Court's historical pos-
ture toward blacks, see D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND THE LAw (1973).
123. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Missouri
ex reL Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
124. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
125. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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is classically expressed in Justice Stone's dissent in the first "flag-
salute" case:
I am not persuaded that we should refrain from passing upon the legis-
lative judgment "as long as the remedial channels of the democratic
process remain open and unobstructed." This seems to me no less
than the surrender of the constitutional protection of the liberty of small
minorities to the popular will. We have previously pointed to the im-
portance of a searching judicial inquiry into the legislative judgment
in situations where prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
tend to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied on to protect minorities. . . . And until now we have not
hesitated similarly to scrutinize legislation restricting the civil liberty of
racial and religious minorities although no political process was af-
fected.'2"
What Justice Stone identified here legally or juridically remains the
chief Achilles heel of the much-celebrated American elective-political
process. The fundamental issues are nowhere more clearly etched
than in the repeal by the California electorate of that state's fair hous-
ing laws and the Warren Court's subsequent decision overturning the
vote of the electorate. 127  But so far at least, the Burger Court, unlike
the Warren Court, does not seem disposed to address these issues so
as to overcome weaknesses of the elective-political process. 128  Even
so, this apparent trend of the Burger Court has not yet lessened the
fact that at least in recent times'12 9 blacks, far more than whites, place
more confidence and trust in the Supreme Court "to do what's right"
than in any other governmental institution. Consider, for example,
the following data:130
126. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 605-06 (1940).
127. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
128. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124
(1971). For an excellent discussion of the Court's different application of "equal
protection" in the context of legislative districting cases originating in the North
and South, see Karst, Not One Law at Rome and Another at Athens: The Four-
teenth Amendment in Nationwide Application, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 383.
129. See Hirsch & Donohew, A Note on Negro-White Differences in Attitudes To-
ward the Supreme Court, in BLACKS IN Tm UNrrED STATES 99 (N. Glenn & C. Bon-
jean eds. 1969). The study is based on data from the Survey Research Center of the
University of Michigan's post-election study of the 1964 presidential election.
130. Taken from Table 3 of illustrative materials given out at a lecture by Arthur
H. Miller, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, delivered at Washing-
ton University, Department of Political Science, March 8, 1974.
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Table
Which part of the government on the list do you most often trust to do
what's right?
1972 1973
Total Whites Blacks Total Whites BlacksCongress 31.7% 32.7% 22.1% 35.8% 36.0% 33.3%
Supreme Court 25.5 23.1 50.0 39.2 38.0 52.5
President 41.4 43.0 25.6 23.7 24.5 14.1
Political Parties 1.4 1.3 2.3 1.3 1.4 0.0
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
While these data lend support to the general view expressed in this
Article, they also raise other interesting observations. Compare, for
example, the significant increase in white trust in the Supreme Court
from 1972 to 1973, to the only marginal increase in black trust in
the Court. Among the explanations that could be offered are: (1)
whites, more than blacks, approve of decisions of the Burger Court
that reflect a reversal or toning down of the policies of the Warren
Court; (2) blacks, more than whites, while recognizing the less
favorable posture of the Burger Court toward their interests, still posit
more trust and hope in the Court than in other political institutions;
and (3) the significant increase in trust in the Court by whites and
the marginal increase in trust by blacks reflect a shift from trust in
the President to other political institutions. Insofar as whites are con-
cerned, the Court has profited from this lack of trust in the President,
while on balance the Congress has gained trust from blacks. How-
ever, whether these explanations are plausible or will survive more
precise empirical analysis is not of consequence here. What is impor-
tant is that blacks still apparently place more trust and hope in the
Supreme Court than in any other institution in the political system.
Thirdly, cutting off the Court as a viable point of access for politi-
cally disadvantaged groups could bring the appearance and the reality
of increased rigidity into the political system. 13 1 This would certainly
make for a more closed system. It could also sharpen and broaden
existing cleavages. Generally, the Warren Court supported politically
disadvantaged groups and provided a legal environment and stimulus
131. Of course, excessive -rigidity is not the hallmark of democratic regimes. As
the New York Times put it editorially: "While those who have attacked the Warren
Court charge that excessive concern with reform is responsible for disorder and crime,
history offers ample evidence that democracy has far more to fear from excessive rigid-
ity." N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1971, § E, at 14, .col. 1.
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in which they and others, including Congress and the President, could
act. Should the Court now becloud or change the legal environment,
it would certainly impede civil rights progress and lessen the pressure
on Congress, the President, and others to continue to deal with these
problems. What then is the recourse open to disadvantaged groups?
One recourse has been the use of direct action: peaceful demon-
stration, civil disobedience, and violence. Unfortunately, the history
of the civil rights movement demonstrates all too vividly that "only
crisis can normally greatly speed the incremental process of change
in America.' 32  Consider the civil rights movement over the past two
decades. First, the Supreme Court acted, rendering revolutionary
changes in the constitutional law affecting black Americans. 13  But,
though changes occurred in the law (obviously important), very few
changes occurred in practice (obviously more important). Court de-
cisions were followed by demonstrations, riots, and violence that forced
crisis situations on the political system. Only then did the President
and Congress pass significant civil rights legislation.' 34 But here
again, as a report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights
clearly documents, 35 the far-reaching changes embodied in such legis-
lation have not produced commensurate changes in practice. This, of
course, illustrates quite clearly that benefits emanating from Congress,
just as those coming from the judiciary, will remain primarily symbolic
unless potential beneficiaries have the necessary resources to convert
them into actual benefits. This does not mean that increased voting and
office-holding on the part of blacks is unimportant. As mentioned
earlier, they are of some, albeit limited, importance. Nor does this mean
that symbolic benefits, such as favorable court decisions, serve no im-
portant function. They do;' 36 indeed, we cannot discount the "sym-
bolic reassurance" function that courts can serve in the political system.
132. H. RoDGERs & C. BUtLLOC, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AND
THEtm CONSEQUENCES 212 (1972).
133. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
134. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, as amended,
28 U.S.C. § 1447, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a to h-6 (1970); Voting Rights
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-
73p (1970).
135. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RiGHTs, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTs ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT (1970). See also U.S. COMM'N ON CIviL RIGTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: ONE YEAR LATER (1971).
136. For a seminal work on the importance of symbols in politics, see M. EDEL-
MAN, THE SYMMOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964).
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Decisions of the Warren Court served to quiet fears, to offer hope to
blacks, and in so doing, acted as a "safety valve," allowing more time for
the political system to deal with the issues involved. In any event, the
Court performed these functions and provided symbolic reassurance to
"threatened" groups such as blacks and the poor. But while symbolic
benefits serve important functions, the rate and extent of their conver-
sion to actual benefits may well determine the future of crisis situa-
tions. Thus, whether direct action is a necessary resource in order
for the political system to respond to black grievances remains very
much in the balance. It also remains very much a dilemma for both
black and white Americans.
Fourthly, should the Burger Court continue to make uncertain, to
narrow, or to negate the policies and posture of the Warren Court,
we might expect still other indirect consequences on other courts and
organizations. We might expect that such actions will have an impor-
tant impact on lower federal 3 7 and state courts. These courts, after
all, perform very crucial functions. They exercise a "gate-keeping"
function to determine what issues enter the judicial arena. They de-
termine, in large measure, how the few major issues that do finally
reach the Supreme Court are phrased for determination by that body.
Lower courts also implement Supreme Court mandates. 3 8  Moreover,
decisions of lower courts are final in most cases. How lower courts
exercise these functions may be determined largely by what they per-
ceive to be, and what is, the actual posture of the Supreme Court.
The same holds true for other governmental institutions and officials,
including, for example, state legislators, school superintendents, and
policemen.
In addition, the Burger Court could affect the operation of interest
groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, that use litigation
137. Though not as dramatic or well-publicized as Supreme Court appointments, ap-
pointments to lower federal courts must also be considered. In this connection, see
the useful data compiled in Goldman, Johnson and Nixon Appointees to the Lower
Federal Courts: Some Socio-Political Perspectives, 34 J. PoLmcs 934 (1972).
138. For a detailed and interesting account of lower-court implementation of the
school desegregation cases, see J. PELTASON, FY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN
FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961). A more recent study of lower
court implementation of federal law is found in C. HAMLToN, TH BENCH AND THE
BALLOT: SoUTERN FEDERAL Juncas Am BLACK VOTERS (1973). See also Murphy,
Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. POL. Sc. Rv. 1017 (1959).
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as a chief tactic for achieving policy objectives. 139 For one thing, liti-
gation strategies must be considered in terms of the changed posture
of the Court. Among the available strategies may be an attempt to
keep certain cases from the Supreme Court and selectively to direct
them to sympathetic lower federal and state courts. "If victory is
achieved at these levels," as one commentator put it, "the role of the
civil liberties lawyer (and an uncharacteristic one) will be to try to
persuade the Supreme Court to practice 'judicial restraint'-to refuse
to review the decisions of lower courts."' 40
In general, "litigation retreat" may well be practiced by such groups
since "no Supreme Court decision is often better than an adverse
one." 41 This is especially true, for example, in situations such as that
presented in DeFunis v. Odegaard,14 2 which the Supreme Court has
accepted for determination. Here, the Washington Supreme Court
held that the University of Washington School of Law could, consistent
with the equal protection provisions of both state and federal constitu-
tions, take into account racial and ethnic background as a positive fac-
tor in the selection and admission of students. An adverse or qualified
decision of the Supreme Court in DeFunis could hold serious conse-
quences for blacks and for affirmative action programs in general.
Moreover, civil rights and civil liberties groups might attempt to
achieve objectives through other forums, especially administrative
agencies. The theory here is that legislative policies of the 1960's
must now be implemented through strong administrative policies in
the 1970's. But, as mentioned previously, detailed reports of the Civil
Rights Commission vividly show that this alternative, though appealing,
does not appear to be very promising.' 43
Finally, the importance and relationship of policy shifts in the War-
ren and Burger Courts to the overall political system are more fully
understood when viewed in the broader political context in which judi-
cial change is occurring. Some years ago Robert Dahl, in a celebrated
article,' 4 presented a formulation about the constituent role of the
139. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1971, § 4, at 8, col. 1 (commentary of Harvard
Law Professor Allan Dershowitz).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 538 (1973).
143. See note 135 supra.
144. See Dahl, supra note 4.
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Supreme Court. Dahl argued essentially that the Court both defines
and legitimates the basic political decisions which are made by domi-
nant majority coalitions rooted in the political branches and, ultimately,
in the electorate. The Warren Court, as Dahl himself recognized,
does not fit this formulation. The Warren Court did more than "de-
fine and legitimate" basic decisions made elsewhere; it fashioned de-
cisions of its own. True, as Dahl explains, there was division among
political elites on the issues involved, and the resulting decisions did
put the Court's authority and prestige on the line. However, in these
decisions the Warren Court illumined a role for the Court that was
somewhat different from the past. The Court used an opportunity
to lead rather than retard the nation on matters that seemingly went to
the heart of the "democratic creed," and forged a really unique, and
perhaps necessary, role for the Court in the political system.
However, on the basis of our discussion here the Burger Court does
not seem disposed to assume this role by safeguarding, and perhaps
expanding, policies that emanated from the Warren Court. Ironically,
but in a real sense, the Burger Court appears to be "following the
election returns" more than it is following the decisions of the Warren
Court. Indeed, even though recent presidential elections141 have not
yet brought about a critical realignment or a new dominant majority
coalition, they have nevertheless mirrored a current of opinion with
respect to the problems of race, crime, and poverty. 14  The policies of
the Burger Court are becoming increasingly congruent with this cur-
rent of opinion. Consequently, whether viewed as "legitimating" or
"capitulating" to current political majorities,147 the thrust of Dahl's
formulation about the constituent role of the Court retains its validity
in light of present trends in judicial policy. However, it is this role
that now contributes to the exacerbation of current problems and to
the capability of the political system to deal with them.
This suggests that the somewhat negative and uncertain posture of
the Burger Court toward civil rights, including "new" civil rights areas
such as rights of the poor, could jeopardize advances already made.
The persistence over a significant period of time of a strong judicial
posture on civil rights can go far toward institutionalizing these civil
145. See W. BuRNrAm, supra note 114.
146. See R. DAWSON, supra note 115.
147. See Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court,
1973 WIs. L. Rnv. 790, 842.
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rights concepts as part of the basic socio-legal structure of the political
system. 148  This is the prime example of the educative function that
the Court can serve in a democratic government. On the other hand,
the actual or apparent vacillation and uncertainty coming from the na-
tion's highest court could easily provide the cover or excuse for many
to return to pre-1954 racial practices in schools, in politics, in the ad-
ministration of justice, and in daily life generally.
Moreover, while other political institutions have crucial roles to play,
judicial abstinence or ambivalence on issues of racial justice could ser-
iously weaken the capability of the political system successfully to over-
come these problems. As I have written elsewhere:
It might be that there are some issues on which the judiciary must
act as a safety valve for the elected political branches, providing lead-
ership when it is reasonably ascertained that elected institutions are
either unwilling or unable to act. This does not mean that in every
instance where elected institutions fail to act, the court must step in.
Such a notion simplifies too much, both the delicate operation of our
governing system as well as the role of the court in that system. On
the contrary, by deciding and fashioning policy on such issues, the court
gives to the governing system that necessary viability and capacity
needed to survive.1' 9
The issues discussed in this Article are of such importance that the
Court in resolving them is faced with perhaps its highest duty under
the Constitution: to lead the way in the protection of minority rights
against majority abuses. This duty is especially appropriate for the
Supreme Court since it commands some "additional reverence because
of the American devotion to 'law' and to the Constitution. '' 15°
148. In an important sense, this raises the more general questions of the impact of and
compliance with court decisions. See generally S. WAsnY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNED
STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERsPEcTVEs (1970). For a review of some of the
recent literature on the consequences of laws, with specific reference to court decisions,
see Rodgers, Law as an Instrument of Public Policy, 17 AM. J. POL. ScI. 638 (1973).
149. Barker. supra note 121, at 64-65.
150. Adamany, supra note 147, at 844.
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